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During her visit to Suva in November 2014, 
Australian foreign minister, Julie Bishop, received 
a very warm reception to her attempts to achieve a 
rapprochement in Australia–Fiji relations. By the 
end of her visit, diplomatic, economic, and defence 
relations had been fully restored with the newly 
elected Bainimarama government (Bishop and 
Kubuabola 2014).
There was, however, one issue that was 
unresolved: that of Fiji’s reported refusal to accept 
the invitation to resume its membership of the 
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) unless Australia and 
New Zealand ceased their membership (Pacnews 
2014a).
As a way of defusing the impasse on this 
significant issue, and of garnering support from 
other Pacific leaders for Australia’s continued 
participation in the PIF, Foreign Minister Bishop 
proposed that Fiji and Australia jointly host a 
summit for Pacific leaders to discuss whether 
and how the regional architecture should be 
reconfigured to meet the needs of the Pacific 
islands states in the 21st century (Callick 2014). 
Her Fijian host, Prime Minister Bainimarama, 
accepted her proposal, and the meeting is now set 
for early 2015 in Sydney.
The Sydney Conference: What Is at Stake?
For Canberra, Fiji’s dramatic demand creates an 
issue of the highest priority. Australia sees the PIF 
as the main vehicle for regional management; it 
sees its own membership of the PIF as crucial to 
that management. As Foreign Minister Bishop 
warned in a press conference in Suva in November, 
she was ‘not going to take that [Australia and 
New Zealand exclusion from the PIF] lying down’ 
(Pacnews 2014b).
However, Canberra also sees Fiji as the hub of 
the Pacific islands region and regards as crucial 
Fiji’s return to full membership in the PIF rather 
than remaining outside the PIF tent fostering an 
alternative regional institutional architecture. There 
is, then, a lot at stake strategically for Canberra 
in Fiji’s challenge on the question of regional 
governance.
There is no obvious solution that could satisfy 
both these strategic objectives. If Australia’s bid to 
win support for continued participation in the PIF 
for Australia and New Zealand succeeds, Australia 
risks Fiji following through on its threat not to 
resume its membership of the PIF.
For the Pacific island states, there are also 
crucial strategic stakes in the outcome of these 
discussions. The configuration of the regional 
architecture is not just about economics and 
efficiency; it is about regional governance — 
about who controls the regional agenda and how 
crucial issues such as Pacific positions on carbon 
emissions targets are to be handled and represented. 
While it is not likely that there will be significant 
support among the island states for the exclusion of 
Australia and New Zealand from the PIF — indeed, 
Prime Minister O’Neill has already made clear that 
Papua New Guinea would not support such a stance 
(ABC News 2014) — there is a longstanding and 
widely felt concern among Pacific leaders about 
the need to gain more Pacific control on issues of 
strategic concern.
The dialogue leading up to, and during, the 
Sydney conference is therefore 
one about the fundamentals of 
how the region is governed. It is 
about reaching a regional political 
settlement between Australia–New 
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Zealand and the island states, and among the island 
states, on a future form of regional governance that 
all parties view to be politically legitimate. The 
last such regional political settlement took place in 
1971 after the struggle by the Pacific island leaders 
to gain control of the power structures in the 
South Pacific Commission and to set up their own 
independent regional organisation, the PIF.1
The way in which the Australian and New 
Zealand leaders, and the Pacific island leaders, 
handled this delicate transition politics from 
colonial to postcolonial regional governance 
stood the region in good stead for the next 
20 years. The understandings about partnership 
and equality underpinning that agreement have, 
however, gradually come under challenge in the 
past 20 years, culminating in the more recent 
resurgence of the demands for the Pacific to ‘chart 
its own course’ and Pacific support for a new 
diplomatic system outside the PIF to achieve that 
goal (Tong 2012).
This paper develops the proposition that all 
parties to the Sydney conference need to recapture 
the spirit of cooperation and partnership that 
underpinned the regional political settlement 
of 1971. This is necessary if key opportunities 
and challenges in the current context are to be 
recognised and a productive dialogue leading to a 
mutually acceptable regional political settlement is 
to be achieved.
The first section of this paper examines 
three important preliminary steps for productive 
dialogue. The first step is to recognise that the Fiji 
and Australian foreign ministers have moved the 
discourse surrounding the upcoming summit away 
from the confrontational language, which initially 
prompted the idea of the Sydney meeting, to a new 
discourse which creates openings for a productive 
dialogue. This new discourse emphasises the need 
to redress power imbalances in regional governance 
rather than excluding Australia and New Zealand 
altogether. It talks of Australia and New Zealand 
‘stepping back’, rather than being asked to leave. A 
second step is to recognise the nature and origins 
of the regional political settlement of 1971, which 
up until recently has provided the governing 
principles underpinning the regional architecture. 
Thirdly, it is important to understand the rising 
concerns of the Pacific island states about the 
unravelling of this political settlement, particularly 
in relation to the changing interpretation of equality 
and partnership by Australia and New Zealand in 
their role within the PIF.
The second section of this paper then advances 
five proposals for possible ways in which Australia 
and New Zealand might ‘stand back’, and the Pacific 
island states might ‘stand forward’, in regional 
governance.
Openings for Productive Dialogue
The negotiating positions of Canberra and Suva 
on the future of Pacific regional governance 
were initially expressed in uncompromising 
language: either Australia and New Zealand leave 
the PIF or Fiji does not resume its membership. 
This did not augur well for the possibility of a 
productive dialogue leading to a new regional 
political settlement acceptable to all stakeholders. 
Fortunately, however, subsequent statements by the 
Fiji and Australian foreign ministers have created a 
space for productive dialogue and compromise.
Although Fiji had made it clear, as late as 
October 2014, that it would only resume its 
membership of the PIF if Australia and New 
Zealand left the regional institution, the Fiji foreign 
minister, Inoke Kubuabola, has since denied 
that Fiji’s position was one of being ‘bent on the 
eviction of Australia and New Zealand from the 
Pacific Islands Forum’ (Pratibha 2014). Rather he 
is reported as saying that ‘regional governance of 
the Pacific Islands is primarily the responsibility of 
their island nations themselves’ and it is therefore 
‘logical that metropolitan developed countries 
like Australia and New Zealand take a step back’ 
(ibid.). This is language that allows a move away 
from direct confrontation over exclusion towards 
productive dialogue on the range of ways Australia 
and New Zealand might ‘step back’.
The Australian foreign minister’s formulation 
of the terms of reference for the Sydney meeting 
provides a further opening for productive dialogue. 
Although the issue she was responding to was the 
Fiji demand that Australia and New Zealand leave 
the PIF, she couched the purpose of the meeting 
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in terms which allows much more open-ended 
dialogue — that of discussing ‘the relevant regional 
architecture to meet the needs of the Pacific 
Islands’. She went on to say that ‘Pacific leaders 
should work out what they wanted as Pacific 
countries and make it relevant for the 21st century’ 
(Pacnews 2014b). This creates an opening for the 
Pacific island states to say what those needs are 
and for Australia and New Zealand to listen to, and 
acknowledge, those needs and for the meeting to 
be open to a broader discussion of how these needs 
might best be met.
Foreign Minister Bishop provided an even 
more important basis for effective dialogue in 
her comments on the proposed regional summit 
during her visit to Papua New Guinea in December 
2014. She said ‘it was time for Pacific leaders to 
chart their own course … adding that a Sydney 
summit early next year could set the regional 
architecture in place for that to happen … I really 
think it’s time the Pacific leaders determine what 
they want for the 21st century and I’m hoping that 
Australia will be able to host that’ (Wroe 2014).
This opens the possibility of effective dialogue 
because it recognises that the underlying need of 
the Pacific island states is to control the regional 
agenda and regional decision-making so that they 
can deal with the issues of utmost concern to them.
This suggests that Canberra has not made 
the mistake of seeing the Fijian demand simply 
as some kind of ‘payback’ for Australia and 
New Zealand’s leading role in suspending Fiji’s 
membership of the PIF in 2009. Fiji commentator 
Wadan Narsey argues this case, for example, seeing 
the Fiji demand as creating an unnecessary ‘storm 
in a calm ocean’ of post-election rapprochement 
between Australia–New Zealand and Fiji, 
motivated by a desire to settle old scores (Narsey 
2014). Fiji’s warm reception to Australia’s proposals 
to restore diplomatic and economic relations 
showed its preparedness to move beyond a payback 
mentality in its bilateral relations. The commitment 
to an independent Pacific regionalism run by 
Pacific islanders is, however, now a basic tenet 
of Fiji’s foreign policy, which the newly elected 
Bainimarama government is clearly not prepared 
to compromise.
The Australian foreign minister’s 
acknowledgement of the need for the Pacific 
to ‘chart its own course’ therefore appears as a 
positive acknowledgement of the deeper concerns 
underpinning the Fijian demands about the 
governance of the PIF. It moves the dialogue 
beyond the strictures of the lenses adopted by both 
Fiji and Australia in their tense relations in the 
period since the 2006 coup.
It is also a very positive sign that Foreign 
Minister Bishop’s language also acknowledges that 
this is not just a position of the Fiji government. 
Australia’s acknowledgement that it is a concern 
shared by many Pacific leaders provides an 
important basis for productive dialogue on a new 
regional political settlement around how this 
concern might be met.
The Regional Political Settlement of 1971
A second key step in approaching dialogue 
focused on a new regional political settlement is 
to recognise the nature and origins of the 1971 
settlement, which underpins the PIF. The regional 
political settlement of 1971 between the Pacific 
island states and Australia and New Zealand did 
not appear in any formal document or treaty. It 
was contained in tacit understandings that arose 
out of discussions leading up to, and during, the 
first forum held in Wellington in August 1971. 
Underpinning the legitimacy of the new regional 
political settlement was the acknowledgement on 
all sides that self-determination for the islands 
region should henceforth be the key principle 
underpinning regional governance of the 
island Pacific.
The creation of the PIF was the culmination 
of a political effort by the Pacific leaders from the 
mid-1960s to challenge the legitimacy of the form 
of regional governance established by a regional 
political settlement among the colonial powers 
meeting at the South Seas Commission Conference 
in Canberra in January 1947 (Australian Treaty 
Series 1948).2 This challenge took the form of a 
‘rebellion’ within the South Pacific Commission, led 
by Ratu Kamisese Mara of Fiji. Reflecting on these 
actions later, Mara commented:
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… the powers seemed incapable of realising 
that the winds of change had at last reached 
the South Pacific and that we peoples of the 
territories were no longer going to tolerate 
the domination of the Commission by the 
Metropolitan powers. We were sick of having 
little to say and no authority. (Mara 1974, 
p. 2)
Their rebellion overturned all the key elements 
in the 1947 colonial regional political settlement 
except for one key issue — the prohibition on 
discussion of political issues. Their frustration 
with this no-politics rule led to their decision to 
establish an independent islands forum where 
anything could be discussed and where island 
agendas could be pursued and promoted (Mara 
1972, p. 5). This frustration was particularly felt 
in relation to the denial of the right of the Pacific 
states to speak about the French nuclear testing at 
Moruroa and Fangataufa atolls.
The Pacific island leaders therefore took 
steps to create a new form of regional governance 
outside the South Pacific Commission. They 
agreed that the new organisation should be built 
on egalitarianism (a rejection of the hierarchy 
of power in the colonial system) and self-
determination (expressed in the decision to only 
invite the independent Pacific island countries as 
members). There was to be no invitation extended 
to dependent territories or to colonial powers. 
A third principle was that there was to be no 
limitation on the discussion of political issues. The 
idea of creating a PIF based on these principles 
was discussed by the Pacific island leaders in the 
late 1960s, gathering pace in 1970 (Fry 1994, 
pp. 138–42).
The decision of the Pacific island leaders to 
invite Australia and New Zealand to join the PIF 
was a controversial one given the underlying 
motivation was to create an organisation that 
would speak for the independent Pacific island 
states. Ratu Mara later explained the decision thus: 
‘We were happy to be joined by Australia and New 
Zealand in the Forum … Indeed, we wanted them 
for a special reason for part of the ambitious plan 
of the Forum … was no less than to alter the whole 
balance of the terms of trade’ (cited in Tarte 1985).
The Pacific island leaders initially approached 
the New Zealand government, which they knew 
to be very sympathetic to the idea of the island 
states creating their own organisation. For example, 
in December 1970, the New Zealand Minister 
for Maori and Island Affairs, Duncan McIntyre, 
stated: ‘… what many Islanders want and what we 
should encourage, is a political forum where island 
countries can meet on equal terms with Australia 
and New Zealand’ (Ball 1973, p. 243). The Pacific 
leaders decided to ask New Zealand to host the first 
forum. When Australian officials became aware 
of these developments they asked Fiji whether 
Australia might attend the first forum to be held 
in Wellington (Doran 2004). Ratu Mara responded 
with an invitation for Australia to attend as an 
observer (Doran 2004, pp. 9–10).3 Australia then 
countered with a request to sit at the table as a full 
member and Mara acceded to this.
The inclusion of Australia and New Zealand 
as full participants in an island-initiated forum 
was significantly assisted by the fact that both 
Canberra and Wellington had indicated strong 
support for the island state endeavours to create 
a new form of regional governance based on self-
determination — both within the South Pacific 
Commission, and in creating an islands forum for 
the independent states. Australia and New Zealand 
accepted the underlying principles of equality and 
self-determination. They acted on these principles 
in taking a back seat in the creation of the new 
organisation, being careful not to dominate 
decisions about the form it would take. They 
recognised they had a partnership role to play, not 
the hegemonic role of the past. They also supported 
the Pacific opposition to French nuclear testing, the 
big symbol of asserting regional self-determination 
and a rallying issue for the new organisation.
The one aspect of the governance of the new 
forum that Australia did try to influence was on 
pressing hard for the admission of Papua New 
Guinea even though it was not yet independent; 
but the Pacific states held firm to the principle of 
self-determination as the admission qualification 
for membership, and this was ultimately accepted 
by Australia.
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What was tacitly agreed between Australia and 
New Zealand and the Pacific island states was a 
form of regional governance in which all were equal 
at the table but with an implicit understanding 
that the island states had primacy in determining 
the regional agenda for the islands region. As Ken 
Piddington, a New Zealand foreign ministry official 
and deputy director of the South Pacific Bureau for 
Economic Co-operation, stated at the time:
[The forum] is an exercise in partnership. 
Australia and New Zealand sit at the table as 
equals, and are not dominant partners. … It 
is tacitly understood that Australia and New 
Zealand will defer when it comes to deciding 
the direction which the Forum as a whole 
should take in asserting its role in the region. 
(Piddington 1973, p. 5)
The attitude and behaviour of the Australian 
and New Zealand leaders and officials at the 
first few forums quickly dispelled any fear of any 
attempt on their part to dominate the agenda or 
the direction of the organisation. The islander 
confidence in their larger neighbours’ goodwill 
was evident in their decision (albeit on the request 
of Australia) to cease, at the second forum, the 
separate island state caucus arrangement which 
had operated prior to, and during, the first forum 
(Doran 2004, p. 16). Moreover, by the late 1970s, 
Ratu Mara’s wisdom of including Australia and 
New Zealand for purposes of changing the terms 
of trade was vindicated by the signing of the 
SPARTECA preferential trade agreement. This 
was a one-way preferential agreement, supported 
by both sides to the negotiations, which therefore 
did not have the controversial elements of the later 
PACER (Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic 
Relations) Plus negotiations.
The Rising Concerns of Pacific Island States
The 1971 settlement created a form of regional 
governance which, for the most part, was seen as 
politically legitimate for the next two decades. The 
strength of this legitimacy was reflected in a very 
active period of joint diplomacy through the PIF. 
Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific island states 
together took on some of the world’s largest powers 
on key issues of concern to the Pacific island states, 
and won. Their successful joint diplomacy, which 
took place under the auspices of the PIF, culminated 
in a series of international treaties on resource 
protection, environmental issues, tuna access; and 
prohibitions on driftnet fishing, the dumping of 
radioactive wastes in Pacific waters, and nuclear 
testing (Fry 1994). They also collectively achieved 
the re-inscription of New Caledonia on the list of 
territories falling under the oversight of the United 
Nations (UN) Decolonisation Committee. These 
were remarkable achievements for joint diplomacy 
by the PIF states as they took on the world’s most 
powerful countries on issues of great concern to the 
national interest of those powers.
The strength of this legitimacy was also 
reflected in the fact that there was robust debate 
among the PIF members on the joint position to be 
taken on all of these issues. Even after the region 
became more strategically important in the ‘second 
Cold War’ of the 1980s, Australia and New Zealand 
did not dominate the outcomes of the forum. 
Although they attempted to assertively promote a 
particular kind of Cold War order on the region, 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s views did not prevail.4 
The outcomes reflected the robust negotiation that 
occurred within the forum; and they were testimony 
to the legitimacy accorded to the understandings 
reached in 1971 about the principles of regional 
governance.
However, after the end of the Cold War there 
was a gradual unravelling of the understandings 
about equality and partnership which underlay 
this legitimacy. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, 
Australia and New Zealand increasingly saw the 
PIF agenda as an extension of their foreign policy, 
and even of their domestic policy, whether it be 
curbing money laundering, promoting security 
harmonisation, constraining the drug trade, 
countering terrorism, pursuing defence surveillance, 
countering tax havens, or promoting a neo-liberal 
regional economic order (Fry 1997, 2005, 2008).
In his review of the regional architecture for the 
PIF in 2005, Tony Hughes made the observation:
Sometimes the confrontational style of 
political management practised in Canberra 
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and Wellington has intruded on the Forum 
and grated upon Pacific Island sensibilities. 
On occasion the strategic priorities of 
Australia and New Zealand have been too 
openly assumed by their representatives to be 
also those of the island states. From time to 
time such irritations have led to suggestions 
of a change of membership status for one or 
both of the two countries. Neither Australia 
nor New Zealand would welcome such a 
move … But the idea remains in the PICT 
subconscious. (Hughes 2005, p. 10)
For Ratu Mara, who made the case in 1971 
for the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand 
in the forum, the changing role of Australia and 
New Zealand had become untenable by 2001 on 
the occasion of the PIF’s 30th anniversary. He 
said he felt a ‘sense of disappointment with our 
metropolitan members … that they have sought to 
impose their solutions in an insensitive way’ (cited 
in Tarte 2014, p. 315).
The shaping of the PIF agenda and outcomes 
has often constrained Pacific island state diplomatic 
efforts on issues that most matter to them. The 
most obvious case is climate diplomacy in relation 
to carbon emissions targets where the interests 
of Australia and New Zealand could not be more 
divergent from that of the island states. Indeed, in 
many ways climate change has become the nuclear 
testing issue of the 21st century. It has brought an 
urgency and united front to island collaboration. 
Where the Pacific states might in the past have 
tolerated some frustration with the domination 
of the regional agenda in the PIF by Canberra 
and Wellington to pursue the war on terror or to 
promote a regional neo-liberal economic order, this 
tolerance may have reached its limit on the climate 
change issue.
One can see the rising anger, among the 
atoll states in particular, on the lack of action by 
the PIF in representing a joint position on this 
question because of the restraining influence of 
Australia and New Zealand on regional positions 
on emissions targets. For the Pacific island states 
it is simply not possible to pursue an Alliance of 
Small Island States position on emissions targets 
through an organisation where Australia and New 
Zealand are present and determined to water down 
any positions which might affect their interests. 
This concern has been accentuated by the Abbott 
government’s extreme position on the issue. 
Marshall Islands foreign minister, Tony de Brum, 
was reported in September 2014 as saying that:
he and the leaders of other Pacific island 
nations were bewildered by what he called 
‘backsliding’ on climate change by Australia, 
which the region had considered to be its 
‘big brother down south’. Probably one of 
the most frustrating events of the past year 
for Pacific islanders is Australia’s strange 
behaviour when it comes to climate change. 
… Island nations had watched with dismay 
not only the abolition of the carbon tax in 
Australia, but also the defunding of scientific 
advisory bodies. … Pacific island nations no 
longer have time to debate climate change 
or even to engage in dialogue about how it 
might be mitigated — they need immediate 
action. Failure to act for us would mean 
disappearance under the sea by the turn of 
the century. (O’Malley 2014)
Embracing the New Pacific Diplomacy
I now propose five possible strategies which might 
be considered to meet these concerns. The first is 
for Australia and New Zealand to recognise that 
there has been a major renaissance among Pacific 
island leaders of the idea that Pacific islanders 
should control regional governance, and assert a 
Pacific voice in global affairs. President Anote Tong 
of Kiribati, for example, has asserted:
I believe the Pacific is now entering a new 
phase — a new paradigm shift where the 
Pacific needs to chart its own course and 
lead global thinking in crucial areas such 
as climate change, ocean governance and 
sustainable development. (Tong 2012)
And for Prime Minister Henry Puna of Cook 
Islands:
the time is right that we take on a more 
concerted effort, as a region, to define 
ourselves on our own terms. Our collective 
interests are being pressured and shaped 
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towards a new Pacific Order — one that won’t 
necessarily meet the expectations of others 
— or the perceptions of outsiders. What is 
important is that we choose what’s best for 
us. We have the ability to define what is good, 
and we have the right to take commanding 
ownership of our future. (Puna 2012)
This renaissance has been significantly 
expressed in the actions of the Pacific island 
states over the past five years in developing a new 
diplomatic architecture outside the PIF system to 
conduct some important aspects of regional affairs, 
and to represent the Pacific islands region to the 
world on the key issues of concern such as climate 
change and fisheries management. For the Pacific 
leaders these moves do not represent a wholesale 
rejection of the PIF; rather a recognition that there 
is a need for complementary forums to undertake 
diplomatic functions and pursue needs which can 
no longer be met in the PIF system.
A key element for a productive dialogue on 
future regional governance is for all parties to 
embrace the valuable contribution of these new 
diplomatic channels, which have grown up out 
of strategic necessity. This is particularly the 
case for Australia and New Zealand, who viewed 
these new institutional developments through a 
‘Fiji’ lens in the period 2009–2014. Although it is 
understandable that Australia and New Zealand 
were not kindly disposed to seeing the value of 
these developments while they were presented 
as an alternative regional system to the PIF, it is 
important that they now be valued in relation to 
the potential contribution they make to meeting 
the future needs of Pacific island states.
The Pacific Small Island Developing States Group
The most significant institutional development 
has been the invigoration of the Pacific Small 
Island Developing States Group (PSIDS) at the 
UN. Although this group had existed since the 
early 1990s in relation to global sustainable 
development negotiations in the Rio process, the 
PSIDS has taken on a dramatically new diplomatic 
role for the Pacific island states in the past five 
years, to the point where it has all but replaced the 
PIF as the primary organising forum for Pacific 
representations at the global level. The PSIDS has 
also become the key diplomatic vehicle for Pacific 
participation in global southern coalitions such as 
the Alliance of Small Island States and the Group 
of 77. It is, for example, the main organising arena 
for determining and prosecuting Pacific positions 
on climate change mitigation in the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and also in relation 
to the Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development in 2012, and the Third International 
Conference on Small Island Developing States in 
Apia, Samoa, in 2014. It is important to note that 
while the enhancement of PSIDS was undoubtedly 
a Fiji-led initiative, it has been strongly supported 
by all Pacific island state UN members.5
In any new settlement on regional architecture, 
the PSIDS would meet the need for global 
diplomatic representation of a ‘Pacific voice’. It 
has gained international recognition for this role 
and been recognised in the renaming of the Asia 
grouping as Asia–Pacific Small Island Developing 
States (or Asia–Pacific group in shorthand). It has 
the advantage of only having Third World countries 
in its membership and is therefore acceptable for 
participation in southern diplomatic coalitions at 
the global level, such as the Alliance of Small Island 
States, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group 
of 77+ China, which are crucial for leveraging 
Pacific positions into global forums. An attempt to 
return to the PIF group as the representative group 
for the Pacific at the UN would compromise these 
advantages and the ability of the Pacific to chart its 
own course.
Melanesian Spearhead Group
A second major expression of the ‘new Pacific 
diplomacy’ has been the reinvigoration of the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) and its 
emergence as a major forum for subregional 
integration, and diplomacy on decolonisation. 
Again, although Fiji leadership provided the catalyst 
for its reinvigoration, it is important to note that all 
Melanesian countries embraced the new and deeper 
integration proposed as part of the new MSG since 
2009. Papua New Guinea leadership was also very 
important in this reinvigoration. The achievements 
have been significant. Most prominent has been 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm8                                                                                                                           State, Society & Govern ce in Melanesia
Greg Fry
the achievement of significant free trade in goods 
and services including the movement of skilled 
labour. The MSG has been able to achieve a level 
of integration not yet achieved in the wider PIF 
grouping in relation to trade and movement of 
professional workers.
The MSG needs to be valued as contributing 
to the Pacific-wide architecture and effort rather 
than being seen as threatening to it. A 2013 review 
on the PIF’s Pacific Plan suggests that the Pacific 
island leaders are viewing the MSG achievements 
as complementary rather than competitive with 
the PIF:
… the success of the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group (MSG) in making progress on 
issues where it has eluded the larger Forum 
grouping, has been construed by some as a 
threat to the Pacific Plan and the Forum. This 
is a mistake. None of the Leaders interviewed 
had this view. Without exception, they saw 
these [subregional] groupings as benefiting 
the regional project by illuminating both 
the challenges of regionalism and ways to 
overcome them successfully. None saw the 
sub-regional groups as competitors to the 
larger Forum grouping. (Pacific Plan Review 
2013, p. 95)
Pacific Islands Development Forum
The third and most controversial element in the 
new regional diplomatic architecture is the Pacific 
Islands Development Forum (PIDF), which was a 
Fiji-led initiative established in 2013. It developed 
out of the Engaging with the Pacific meetings, 
which Fiji organised from 2010 as a means of 
building ties with its Pacific neighbours following 
suspension from the PIF. While clearly the flagship 
of the Fiji government’s efforts to lead regional 
diplomacy after suspension from the PIF, the new 
kind of regional diplomacy it represented clearly 
appealed to many other Pacific leaders. There were 
three novel elements, which particularly seemed to 
capture the imaginations of Pacific island leaders.
The first was that the new institution empha-
sised inclusivity, a connection between leaders 
and society, which had been lacking in the PIF. It 
brought together civil society groups, the private 
sector and international agencies and governments 
in a process that emphasised partnerships and 
network diplomacy. Second is its focus on ‘green 
growth’, which seemed to offer hope of overcoming 
the stalling on what was seen as non-action in key 
areas such as climate change and sustainable devel-
opment. Finally, the PIDF was motivated by the 
desire for self-determination. At the PIDF secretar-
iat opening in 2014, Prime Minister Bainimarama 
said the Fiji-based group had a single purpose:
It is not a question of prestige or establishing 
yet another talk fest, it is about creating an 
organisation that is more attuned to our 
development needs as Pacific countries. 
It is about creating an organisation that is 
relatively free of interference from outsiders. 
(Cooney 2014)
Although Prime Minister Bainimarama has said 
that the PIDF was not intended to compete with 
the PIF he seemed to give a different impression in 
other statements about the organisation’s purpose:
Why do we need a new body, a new 
framework of cooperation? Because the 
existing regional structure for the past four 
decades — the Pacific Islands Forum — is for 
governments only and has also come to be 
dominated only by a few. (Pareti 2013a)
Parties to the Nauru Agreement
The fourth institutional development was the 
creation of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement 
in 2009. This was set up by the island states 
with big tuna stocks as a way of gaining greater 
control over their shared resource. The tiny but 
effective Majuro-based secretariat has been highly 
successful in creating novel ideas in fisheries 
management which have translated into dramatic 
increases in revenue to the member countries. 
Sandra Tarte reminds us this development predates 
the Fiji suspension from the PIF and therefore 
demonstrates a broader regional assertion of Pacific 
control over regionalism (Tarte 2014, pp. 314–16).
New Trade Negotiation Agencies
Finally, Pacific island states have created new 
Pacific-run institutions outside the PIF to negotiate 
trade and economic relationships with Australia 
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and New Zealand, and with Europe. In the case 
of negotiations with Australia and New Zealand 
on PACER Plus, they argued for an independent 
office outside the PIF to provide advice on the 
negotiations. The Vila-based Office of the Chief 
Trade Adviser was established in 2009 against 
Australian and New Zealand efforts first to oppose 
its creation, then to dictate who the adviser 
would be and finally to sideline it. In the case 
of negotiations with the European Union over a 
regional economic partnership agreement, and 
in relation to developing Pacific positions to take 
to Africa Caribbean Pacific (ACP) meetings, the 
Pacific island states decided in 2012 to create a 
Pacific ACP office based in Port Moresby. The 
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) had 
previously been the responsible agency for this 
function (Komai 2014).
Together, these developments add up to a new 
Pacific diplomatic system, which now handles 
the core global diplomatic needs of the Pacific 
island states in relation to key issues such as trade, 
climate change, decolonisation and sustainable 
development. This new system has worked well 
to meet those needs, and is widely supported by 
Pacific island states. It would therefore be a mistake 
to try to rein their valuable functions in under a 
PIF umbrella to try to restore the earlier status quo. 
They go a long way to meeting the needs of the 
Pacific island states to determine their own futures 
in global diplomacy.
Overall this suggests a system or regional 
architecture in which the PIF and other CROP 
(Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific) 
agencies exist as they are now, and alongside 
them are the PSIDS, the MSG and PIDF as key 
complementary agencies. These new agencies 
perform tasks that the PIF was either having 
difficulty doing or was no longer prioritising. 
PSIDS provides an islands-region voice at the 
global level and in global southern coalitions; 
MSG provides a model of subregional integration 
which can help build a more effective Pacific-
wide regional integration; and PIDF provides a 
much-needed islands-run forum which includes 
civil society and the private sector in discussions 
of regional policy on green growth issues. This 
would, however, necessarily be — to use Tess 
Newton Cain and Matthew Dornan’s useful phrase 
— a ‘patchwork’ regional architecture (Dornan 
and Newton Cain 2014, p. 555). The challenge 
then becomes one of weaving coherence into this 
patchwork rather than trying to unpick the threads.
Weaving Coherence into a ‘Patchwork’ 
Regional Architecture
It follows that a second important element for 
consideration in a productive dialogue on the 
future regional architecture is to ensure that this 
patchwork architecture is fit for one purpose 
and that parts of it are not working against other 
parts, either actively or inadvertently. This means 
assuaging the concerns of Australia and New 
Zealand, but also other Pacific island states, that 
the PIDF, and to a lesser extent MSG, are no longer 
seen as providing a competing system but rather 
one that complements the existing PIF system. It 
is understandable that there would be a need for 
clarification and reassurance over how far and in 
what direction Fiji intends to develop the PIDF, 
assuming that the PIF is appropriately reformed to 
meet Fiji’s concerns that Australia and New Zealand 
need to ‘stand back’.
As a discussion forum that includes civil society 
and private sector and which focuses on green 
growth issues, the PIDF fills a vacuum. However, 
if it develops, as earlier intended, as an alternative 
political summit to the PIF, and as giving a mandate 
to PSIDS at the global level, then this is of a very 
different order. Such duplication entailed in the 
setting up of alternative systems needs to be avoided 
if a regional political settlement is to be reached. 
This is not just to meet the concerns of Australia 
and New Zealand but also those of other Pacific 
island countries. While they might support the 
contributions being made by the PIDF as a regional 
forum for discussion with civil society and the 
private sector, they are unlikely to support the PIDF 
competing with or displacing the PIFS as the main 
body of Pacific regional governance (particularly if 
PIFS is reformed to meet island country concerns). 
The Pacific leaders have just been through a process 
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of extensive consultation on the new Framework 
for Pacific Regionalism and as recently as July 2014 
jointly committed to its implementation under the 
auspices of the PIFS (PIFS 2014b). 
Fiji has already indicated that it too is 
concerned with duplication and waste of resources 
and is interested in finding the best architecture 
to meet the needs of the Pacific. The Fiji foreign 
minister has argued that rationalisation of the 
regional architecture would be at the core of what 
Fiji will put forward at the Sydney meeting. He 
said Fiji was seeking to avoid the duplication 
and overlapping evident in the current set-up 
(Pacnews 2014c).
Australia and New Zealand ‘Stepping Back’
A third necessary element for a productive dialogue 
is for Australia and New Zealand to acknowledge 
why the Pacific might want Australia and New 
Zealand to ‘step back’ within the PIF, and the need 
for discussion of ways of achieving this. Foreign 
Minister Bishop’s statement in Port Moresby in 
December 2014 suggests that Australia does not yet 
understand that there is a Pacific perception that it 
is the actions of Australia and New Zealand within 
the PIF which are seen as constraining the Pacific 
island states’ capacity to chart their own course. In 
her interpretation of the undue influence which 
needed to be countered in a reconfiguration of 
regional architecture, the foreign minister focused 
instead on China and Taiwan:
We need more investment … from many 
countries in the Pacific, but we must make 
sure it’s in the interests of the particular 
Pacific islands, as opposed to some other 
geopolitical or strategic agenda of another 
country.
Pacific nations had historically been prone to 
influence from countries outside the region 
using their aid budgets to win, for example, 
countries’ support in United Nations votes; 
China and Taiwan being recent examples. 
(Wroe 2014)
It is not such influence from countries outside 
the region that Pacific leaders have in mind 
when they talk about the Pacific charting its own 
course. Central to the Pacific concerns is that the 
Australia–New Zealand role within the PIF has 
drifted a long way from the tacit understandings 
about the agreed principles underpinning regional 
governance established in 1971 at the time of the 
creation of the PIF.
While acknowledgement of these issues may 
go some way towards influencing Canberra and 
Wellington to step back from their dominant 
role in the PIF and embrace interpretations of 
partnership more akin to those of 1971, this cannot 
be relied upon. One practical reform that could 
be considered might therefore be to reinstate 
the Pacific island state caucus within the PIF. 
Significantly, the Wellington forum was run in a 
5 + 2 format with separate caucus meetings for 
the Pacific island leaders both before and during 
the forum. This would create a space within the 
governance of the PIF for the Pacific islands to 
deliberate without the presence of Australia and 
New Zealand. This would allow smaller states, 
which are heavily dependent on Australia and 
New Zealand for economic assistance, to assert 
their positions in a way that would be difficult 
in the broader forum with Australia and New 
Zealand present.
Increasing Pacific Financial Ownership of 
the PIF
A fourth possible strategy for meeting the Pacific 
concern to chart its own course concerns the 
financial arrangements of the PIF. A major problem 
for creating a Pacific regional architecture that 
engenders a feeling of Pacific ownership is the 
fact that the bulk of the ‘main’ budget (defined 
as including regular and core budgets, but not 
including the extra budget) of the PIFS is paid 
for by Australia and New Zealand. Based on 2013 
figures, Canberra and Wellington fund 94 per cent 
of the core + regular budget. The Pacific island 
states contribute 5 per cent (Table 1).
The question of the financial arrangements 
underpinning the PIF, and the link to political 
ownership, is obviously an important element for 
consideration in a dialogue on how the regional 
architecture can be reformed to better able the 
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Pacific to ‘chart its own course’. The PIF has a very 
special place in the regional architecture as the 
place where the leaders decide overall strategy. It 
is not an implementing agency. Its running costs 
can therefore be relatively modest and need not 
rely on donors. Indeed, because of its key role 
in devising strategy it should be the place least 
beholden to donors. The maximisation of Pacific 
financial control of the core and regular budget of 
the regional organisation charged with strategising 
at the highest levels has both symbolic and 
pragmatic implications for Pacific ownership of the 
regional agenda.
The financial issue was recognised as a problem 
for Pacific island ‘ownership’ of the PIF by the 2005 
review Strengthening Regional Management: A 
Review of the Architecture for Regional Co-operation 
in the Pacific (the Hughes report):
There is a readily-stirred suspicion among 
them [the Pacific leaders and officials] that 
the regional paymasters use this position to 
call the shots on policy, even though they 
often fall over backwards not to appear to 
do so. It seems clear that Australia and New 
Zealand value the policy leverage that their 
supportive financial role gives them and 
regard it as money well spent. (Hughes 2005, 
p. 11)
The 2012 Review of the Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat (the Winder report) also recognised 
the importance of this issue. Unfortunately, 
however, the Pacific leaders have yet to consider 
the report’s recommendations (Dornan 2012). The 
report stated:
The Review Team understands the fiscal 
pressures on member states, but considers that 
the very low proportion of annual revenue 
contributed by member states reinforces 
a lack of ownership of the Secretariat by 
members. The Review Team understands 
that the regular budget contribution of 
members to the Forum is a fraction of the 
level of contribution paid to (for example) the 
Commonwealth Secretariat. The on-going 
level of commitment to and ownership of the 
Secretariat and its work needs to be addressed 
by member states. (Winder et al. 2012, p. 39)
A simple but highly effective way of having 
Australia and New Zealand ‘take a step back’ and 
for the Pacific to better ‘chart its own course’ is 
therefore to change the funding formula to allow 
a higher contribution from the larger economies 
of the region. For example, in relation to the core 
+ regular budget, consideration could be given to 
Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Australia and New Zealand 
each paying 20 per cent and the other Pacific 
island states collectively picking up the remaining 
20 per cent on a pro rata basis. In 2013 the core 
and regular budgets together totalled $18 million 
Fiji dollars (Table 1). On this basis, Australia, New 
Zealand, Fiji and Papua New Guinea would each 
pay F$3.6 million. This would enforce the founding 
principle of an equal partnership.
By increasing the Pacific financial stake from 
5 per cent to 60 per cent of the core + regular 
budget of the organisation, the Pacific island states 
would then be in a position to more easily control 
the regional agenda and the PIF would be more 
Table 1. Budget arrangements for the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2013











Core budget 0 0 $14 million 100 $14 million
Regular budget $1 million 25.6 $3 million 74.4 $4 million
Total budget (core + regular) $1 million 5 $17 million 94 $18 million
Source: PIFS (2014a, 2014c).
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easily seen by others as a southern-controlled 
organisation by global agencies and donors. Such 
reforms would go some way to meeting Fiji’s 
concerns about Australia and New Zealand being 
given special preference among the donors. In this 
scenario the Pacific would negotiate with Australia 
and New Zealand and other donors on extra 
budget contributions but from the strong position 
of the island states funding the core operations of 
the PIF. It would be, and would be seen as, a Pacific 
islands forum.
Pacific Island Leadership within the PIF
A final suggested basis for effective dialogue on 
the nature of future regional governance is for 
the Pacific island leaders to acknowledge that the 
dominance of Australia and New Zealand over the 
PIF agenda, and on PIF outcomes, over the past 
20 years has not only been due to the ‘pushiness’ of 
their larger neighbours; that the other contributing 
factor was the lack of political contest from the 
island state members of the PIF. Australia and New 
Zealand are only two states among 16 meeting 
around the table. It is worth recalling two well-
known examples where Pacific island states failed 
to assert themselves against the positions promoted 
by Australia and New Zealand on issues of the 
highest priority.
At the August 2009 PIF in Cairns, Australian 
officials drafted the Pacific Leaders Call to Action 
on Climate Change, which was seemingly approved 
by all PIF leaders. Nic Maclellan, a journalist who 
was present at the Cairns forum, argues that ‘The 
Call to Action largely reflected Australian policy on 
greenhouse gas emissions, rejecting much stronger 
targets advocated by a number of small island 
states’. A month later Pacific leaders ‘contradicted 
the deal struck in Cairns’. They committed to the 
much tougher position of the Alliance of Small 
Island States (Maclellan 2009).
At the August 2012 Rarotonga forum the 
island states could have prevailed on the question 
of whether to endorse the call for reinscribing 
French Polynesia on the list of the Decolonisation 
Committee’s list of dependent territories. Rather 
than contest Australia and New Zealand’s pro-
France position within the PIF, the island states left 
the prosecution of their real position to the UN 
General Assembly. As Nic Maclellan reports:
a month after the Forum, without the 
restraining influence of Canberra and 
Wellington, the leaders of Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Fiji and Vanuatu lined up at the UN 
General Assembly, explicitly calling for action 
on decolonisation. ... In February [2013], the 
UN ambassadors for Solomon Islands, Tuvalu 
and Nauru formally lodged a draft resolution 
at the General Assembly. (Maclellan 2013)
The final resolution, again sponsored by 
Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Nauru (and also 
supported by Vanuatu, Samoa and Timor Leste) 
was adopted in May 2013 after strong opposition 
from France.
Each of these issues could have been contested 
in the PIF but Pacific island state leadership was 
lacking at the time. The Pacific island states need to 
recapture the level of political agency that they had 
within the PIF in the 1970s and 1980s, and up until 
1990. In this period the Pacific leaders contested 
proposals emanating from Australia and New 
Zealand if they disagreed with them (Fry 1993).
A telling example was the way in which the 
Pacific states stood up to Australia about American 
plans to incinerate chemical weapons on Johnston 
Island at the 1990 PIF in Port Vila, where this issue 
dominated the agenda. Australia attempted to 
garner island support for the incineration facility on 
the grounds that it was an important contribution 
to global disarmament and that it was safe. The 
island states regarded the Australian efforts, and 
particularly the way in which prime minister Bob 
Hawke sought to have his minority view dominate, 
as unacceptable behaviour (O’Callaghan 1990). In 
the communique the views of the Pacific island 
states prevailed over those of Australia:
The Forum felt very strongly that the facility 
at Johnston Atoll should not become the 
permanent toxic waste disposal centre of the 
world. They expressed their firm conviction 
that the facility should be closed down once 
the current operations had been completed 
and called on the United States to ensure 
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that no further chemical weapons or other 
toxic materials would be stockpiled on or 
destroyed at Johnston Atoll. (PIFS 1990, 
item 30)
Fiji has a particularly important role to play 
in this regard. It sees itself, and to a great extent 
is seen, as a key regional leader in such contexts. 
As it is less dependent on Australia and New 
Zealand economically than the other Pacific 
island countries it can take a more independent 
position. There is also a history of Fiji standing 
up to Australia and New Zealand in regional 
forums. There needs to be acknowledgement by 
Fiji that the PIF is the best place for such political 
agency, and that Fiji can best exercise its desire to 
give leadership to a Pacific island voice within a 
reformed PIF rather than outside it.
Conclusion
Despite the unfortunate way in which the Sydney 
conference was announced — without consultation 
with other Pacific island states — it nevertheless 
provides an opportunity to have a productive 
regional dialogue on an issue whose time has 
come. Now that Fiji has a democratically elected 
government it is time to discuss ways in which the 
regional architecture can be reconfigured most 
appropriately to meet the needs of the Pacific 
island states.
In this paper I have outlined some areas 
for discussion which could lead to a productive 
regional settlement. They include (1) valuing 
the new diplomatic system which has grown up 
organically outside the PIF to meet strategic needs 
in global and regional diplomacy; (2) recognising 
the need to make this new diplomatic system fit 
coherently with a reformed PIF system rather than 
competing with it (that is, retaining a reformed 
PIF as the key seat of regional governance via 
the leaders’ summit); (3) recognising the need 
for Australia and New Zealand to return to a 
1971 interpretation of equality and partnership 
within the PIF with possible consideration of 
a reintroduction of the island caucus system of 
the first PIF; (4) consideration of changing the 
financial arrangements of the PIF combined core 
and regular budgets to allow for a stepping forward 
of Pacific island states to increase their contribution 
from 5 per cent to 60 per cent of this budget and a 
stepping back of Australia and New Zealand from 
providing 95 per cent of this core funding (2013 
figures) to 40 per cent; and (5) consideration of a 
return to the active Pacific islands leadership and 
contest of the Australia–New Zealand control of 
the regional agenda within the PIF. The ‘standing 
forward’ of the Pacific island states could be on the 
foundation of a new islands caucus, an island state 
majority share of the funding of the core budget, as 
well as Fiji’s return to PIF membership, and a more 
active Papua New Guinea in regional affairs.
The thrust of this argument is for a model 
which both keeps Australia and New Zealand 
within the PIF and at the same time meets the 
concerns of the Pacific island states about ‘charting 
their own course’. Some might see this as wanting 
it both ways, but the alternatives — two separate 
and competing regional systems, or Australia and 
New Zealand outside the PIF altogether — are not 
productive for any of the parties involved.6 They 
also do not command sufficient political support 
among the Pacific island states. Doing nothing is 
also not a sensible option if the political legitimacy 
of the PIF is to be restored. It is not in a spirit of 
nostalgia that this paper recalls the lessons of the 
1971 settlement, but rather in terms of a workable 
outcome that gained political legitimacy because it 
was built on genuine partnership and equality, and 
respect for self-determination.
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Endnotes
1 The organisation was founded in 1971 as the South 
Pacific Forum; in 2000 it became the Pacific Islands 
Forum.
2 The nature of this 1947 settlement and the debate 
leading up to it is discussed in detail in Smith (1972).
3 See also footnote 51 in Doran (2004, p. 29): ‘on 
10 May, New Zealand transmitted a second letter 
from Ratu Mara in which he explained that he had 
neglected to mention the wish of Island leaders that 
New Zealand invite Australia as an observer [to the 
upcoming Wellington Forum]’. Doran is citing a 
letter from Millen (New Zealand ministry) to Moodie 
(Australian ministry) of 10 May 1971.
4 This argument is developed in detail in Fry (1993, 
pp. 229–35).
5 I am indebted to Fulori Manoa, postgraduate scholar 
in Diplomacy and International Affairs at the 
University of the South Pacific, for these insights on 
the role of PSIDS at the UN.
6 The strategic case (on behalf of the Pacific island 
states) for the exclusion of Australia and New 
Zealand from the PIF has been most persuasively 
argued by Kaliopate Tavola, Ambassador at Large for 
the MSG and former foreign minister for Fiji. He first 
presented these ideas in his paper ‘The PIDF and the 
Future of Regionalism’ seminar at the University of 
the South Pacific (USP) in September 2013 (Pareti 
2013b) and later developed them in a paper ‘Towards 
a New Regional Diplomatic Architecture’ to the 
USP’s New Pacific Diplomacy workshop in December 
2014 (Tavola 2014). In his proposal, Australia and 
New Zealand are excluded from the PIF but retain a 
special relationship with the Pacific island states; they 
comprise an inner circle of dialogue partners with 
the PIF, in an ‘FIC–ANZ Contractual Arrangement’. 
The case for ‘recasting’ the PIF as an island state–only 
grouping and replacing Australian and New Zealand 
membership with a special relationship is also made 
by Derek Brien (2014) of the Pacific Institute of 
Public Policy.
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